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HIS Article reviews legislative and case law developments in the ar-
eas of wills, nontestamentary transfers, heirship, estate administra-
tion, guardianships, and trusts. The Survey period covers decisions
published between November 1, 1988, and October 31, 1989, as well as
changes to the Probate Code and the Property Code enacted by the Seventy-
First Texas Legislature.
I. WILLS
Will Construction. In White v. Moore I the supreme court reversed and re-
manded the case because it determined that the language in the will was
ambiguous. 2 Mattie Moore left her property to her six children, whom she
named in the will, and to the survivor or survivors of the children at her
death. 3 One of Moore's children predeceased her, leaving a daughter and a
granddaughter. The trial court, affirmed by the court of appeals,4 had en-
tered a summary judgment that the daughter and granddaughter of the de-
ceased child could not take under the terms of the will. The supreme court
further considered whether, if Moore were found to have intended a class
gift to her surviving children, the antilapse statute5 would take precedence
over the class gift.6 The court held that the antilapse statute does not over-
ride the testator's intent when the testator desires only surviving members of
a class to take under his or her will. 7 The dissent stated that the language of
* B.A., University of Texas at Arlington; M.L.A., J.D., Southern Methodist University.
Attorney at Law, Taylor & Mizell, Dallas, Texas.
1. 760 S.W.2d 242 (rex. 1988).
2. Id at 243, 244. The court found that the meaning of the language was so unclear that
the trial court would have to hear evidence on the testatoes intent Il. at 244.
3. The pertinent language in the will is set forth id at 243.
4. 747 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1988). For a discussion of the appeals court's
decision in this case, see Candler, Wills and Trusts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 43 Sw.L.J.
305, 307-08 (1989) [hereinafter Candler, 1989 Annual Survey].
5. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 68 (Vernon 1980).
6. 760 S.W.2d at 244.
7. Id. The court noted that the Texas Legislature could have included language in § 68
of the Probate Code to apply the antilapse statute to class gifts, but it did not do so. Id The
court stated as follows:
We perceive no statutory basis in Texas for holding that a testator may not
validly require survivorship as a condition to taking under his will, even if the
class devisees would otherwise come within the coverage of section 68 of the
Texas Probate Code. Furthermore, we find no public policy interest sufficient to
invalidate survivorship provisions so intended.
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the will was unambiguous and noted that the court should not consider the
issue of ambiguity on appeal because the issue was not presented to the trial
court in writing.8
In Hancock . Krause9 the Houston court determined that the term
"heirs" as used in a holographic will meant the specific legatees rather than
its usual meaning.10 The testator left a life estate in his property to his wife,
with specific devises and bequests of the estate following his wife's death.
The testator stated that his heirs would receive their "bequested inheritance"
only upon the death of his wife. The testator did not leave any property to
his three children by his first wife, who brought suit for declaratory judg-
ment construing the will. The trial court, in a summary judgment, found
that the use of the term "heirs" did not provide any rights to his heirs at law
because he spoke of the heirs' bequested inheritance. The appeals court
agreed.II The appellate court further found that an interlineation made by
the testator at a later date was valid. 12 They determined, however, that the
trial court erred in determining that the term "loose monies" meant all legal
tender because the term is ambiguous.' 3
The San Antonio court in Sharp v. Broadway National Bank 14 considered
whether a testator intended to include adopted children in his definition of
"relatives of the whole blood and/or their issue."' 5 At the time the testator
executed his will he had several whole brothers and sisters and one half-
brother living. One of the testator's whole brothers had died, survived by
four children, two of whom had adopted children. The testator's property
passed into trust for the benefit of his relatives of the whole blood on his
death. One of the deceased brother's children who had adopted children
died in 1984. The trustee bank refused to distribute her former share of in-
come to her two adopted children. The bank filed an action for declaratory
judgment construing the will and the trial court granted summary judgment,
finding that the testator unambiguously excluded any beneficiary's adopted
children from taking an interest in the testamentary trust. The appeals court
considered the wording of the Texas adoption statute in effect at the time the
Id.
8. Id at 245 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that an issue not presented to
the trial court in writing could not be considered as grounds for reversal on appeal per TEx. R.
Civ. P. 166a(c). Id
9. 757 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
10. Id at 120.
11. Id The testator also stated in the specific bequests that the named legatees "and
heirs" would take the devised and bequeathed property. The court construed "heirs" as used
in the specific bequests to mean the heirs of the named beneficiaries, not the testator's heirs.
Id.
12. Id. at 121. The will and the interlineation were both holographic.
13. Id The ambiguity presents a factual issue, thus precluding summary judgment. The
court also found that the term "MMCD(6)" was ambiguous despite the contention that the
term meant "Money Market Certificate of Deposit." Id. at 122. The inventory in the estate
listed five certificates of deposit and no evidence existed that the testator had a sixth that he
closed prior to his death.
14. 761 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ).
15. Id at 143.
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testator executed his will, 16 but stated that the statute did not control when
the testator clearly intended otherwise. 17
In Disabled American Veterans v. Mullin 18 the San Antonio court found
that the testator left his wife his community interest in their residence in fee
simple.' 9 The testator's wife died some years after her husband and left the
residence to her siblings. The court stated that in the absence of a clear
intention to convey a lesser estate, a will conveys a fee simple estate.20 The
court found that the wife made full disposition of the residence in her will,
thus leaving no residuary interest in the residence for the Disabled American
Veterans to take under the testator's will.2 '
The Amarillo court in Roberts v. First State Bank 22 construed the wills of
a husband and wife to provide that only their children who survived them
could take under their wills. 23 The couple's wills, which had identical pro-
visions, provided for a trust for the surviving spouse for life with the remain-
der to be divided into as many equal shares as there were children surviving
the first spouse to die. The wills also provided that if the other spouse prede-
ceased the testator, the testator's estate would be divided into as many equal
shares as there were children living upon the testator's death. Finally, the
wills contained a provision for distribution of the share of a child who sur-
vived the first spouse to die, but who predeceased the death of the surviving
spouse, to that child's descendants. After the execution of their wills, but
prior to the death of the first of them to die, two of their children died. All
of the couple's other children survived both of them. The husband prede-
ceased his wife, and the bank trustee of the testamentary trust and executor
of the estate of the wife sought a declaratory judgment as to whether the
trust and estate should be distributed only to the children who survived the
couple or to the surviving children and the children of deceased children.
The trial court entered a declaratory judgment that the testators intended to
divide their estates among their children who survived at their respective
deaths. The appeals court found that each of the seven children who sur-
vived the husband was entitled to a one-seventh share of the marital trust
upon the wife's death, and that if one of the seven surviving children had
predeceased the wife his or her share would have passed to his or her de-
16. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 46a, § 9 (Vernon 1969).
17. 761 S.W.2d at 144. The court further found that the trial court erred in allowing the
bank's attorney to testify as an expert witness when the attorney failed to designate himself as
an expert prior to thirty days before trial as required by former Tax. R. Civ. P. 166b(5) (now
TEx. R. Cirv. P. 166b(6)). 761 S.W.2d at 14647. This error, however, was not reversible
error.
18. 773 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ).
19. Id at 411. The testator left all of his property to his wife "with full power to sell or
dispose of same as to her may seem best." Id at 409. The testator provided, however, that if
his wife died without disposing of their residence he wished it to go to their granddaughter if
she met certain conditions or, if the granddaughter did not meet those conditions, to the Dis-
abled American Veterans.
20. Id at 410.
21. Id at 411.
22. 774 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1989, writ granted).
23. Id at 416.
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scendants. 24 Further, each of the seven children who survived the wife was
entitled to a one-seventh share of her estate.25
In Perkins v. Damme26 the Corpus Christi court found that the testator
did not intend to include the value of property passing to his brothers by
joint tenancy with rights of survivorship in determining the value of a be-
quest to his spouse's relatives of a "like amount in value."'27 The court based
its holding on the testamentary gift to his brothers of real and personal prop-
erty located in Kansas and real property located outside of Texas.28 The
court found that property held as a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship
passes automatically to the survivors on the death of a joint tenant and does
not pass pursuant to the terms of the deceased joint tenant's will. 29 Thus,
the value of the property passing pursuant to the joint tenancy could not be
included in determining the value of the property passing to the brothers
under the terms of the will. 30
In McGill v. Johnson 31 the Austin court found that the testator's will cre-
ated a contingent remainder interest for the testator's two sisters in property
placed in trust for his son's benefit.32 The testator's will established a trust
that required the trustee to distribute all of the personal property in the
trust to the son on his thirty-fifth birthday, with distribution of the real prop-
erty as well if the son then had a living biological child born in wedlock. If
the son did not have a living child when he attained the age of thirty-five and
thereafter no child was born to him during marriage, the trustee was to dis-
tribute the real property to the testator's two sisters or their issue. One sister
had a daughter, but the other sister had no living issue. When the sister with
no children died, the son claimed that the gift to that sister lapsed and that
he took her interest in the real property by intestacy. The court agreed.33
Testamentary Capacity. In Alldridge v. Spell 34 the Texarkana court held
that the jury's finding that the testator did not have testamentary capacity
was not against the weight and preponderance of the evidence.35 The testa-
tor's daughter offered a will for probate and the testator's widow contested
the probate because of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity.
24. Id. at 417-18.
25. Id. at 418.
26. 774 S.W.2d 765 (rex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
27. Id at 766.
28. Id. at 767.
29. Id.
30. Id The court also found that no genuine issue of fact existed concerning the valuation
placed on the property passing to the brothers under the will. Id at 768.
31. 775 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ requested).
32. Id at 831. The court first found that the remainder gift of the trust property to the
testator's two sisters was a specific bequest, not a class gift. Id at 829.
33. Id. at 832. The court also determined that the open mine doctrine applied not only to
oil and gas leases included in the trust estate that the testator executed during his life, but also
to oil and gas leases executed by the trustee pursuant to the right given to the trustee to execute
mineral leases. Id. at 833. The life tenant thus was entitled to all of the proceeds from the
leases, not just the interest earned on royalties and bonuses. Absent the application of the open
mines doctrine, the royalties and bonuses would have been included as trust corpus.
34. 774 S.W.2d 707 (rex. App.-Texarkana 1989, no writ).
35. Id at 710.
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Both the daughter and the widow introduced evidence concerning the testa-
tor's testamentary capacity, but the jury determined that the testator lacked
capacity. The court also found that the testator's daughter was not entitled
to attorney's fees because she did not request a jury finding of whether she
offered the will for probate in good faith.36
In Campbell v. Groves37 the El Paso court found that the testator had
testamentary capacity on the day he executed his will. 38 Direct evidence
existed that the testator knew the objects of his bounty and the extent and
nature of his estate when he executed his will.39 Other testimony existed
that the testator occasionally hallucinated, was disoriented and felt perse-
cuted, but these occasions occurred other than on the date he executed his
will.
In Jones v. LaFargue40 the Houston court found that substantial evidence
supported the jury's finding that the testator lacked testamentary capacity.41
The testator's nieces and nephews, his nearest relatives, contested a will ad-
mitted to probate that benefitted three individuals who were not members of
the testator's family. The contestants, who had the burden of establishing
the testator's lack of capacity since the will had already been admitted to
probate, introduced medical evidence that the testator suffered from demen-
tia, a degenerative disease, prior to the date he purportedly executed the will.
The appeals court found that the evidence concerning decedent's lack of tes-
tamentary capacity was both factually and legally sufficient to support the
jury's finding that the testator lacked testamentary capacity.42
II. NONTESTAMENTARY TRANSFERS
The Beaumont court in Grey v. Bertrand43 examined a joint tenancy bank
account that did not provide for rights of survivorship. The decedent
opened an investment account in his name, the names of his three sons, and
his wife's name. Two days after the decedent's death, the three sons con-
tacted the bank and requested payment of any funds held in any bank ac-
counts in their names. The bank officer contacted by the sons informed
them that the bank held no accounts in their names. The bank paid the
funds in the account to the decedent's widow two days later. The sons sued
the bank and the bank officer, alleging that the defendant bank and bank
officer had fraudulently concealed the sons' interest in the account. The jury
found that the decedent had not made a gift of any portion of the funds in
36. Id. at 711.
37. 774 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. App,-El Paso 1989, writ denied).
38. Id at 719.
39. Id The court also stated as follows: "[a] person could appear bizarre or absurd with
reference to some matters and still possess the assimilated and rational capacities to know the
objects of his bounty, the nature of the transaction in which he was engaged and nature and
extent of his estate on a given date." Id
40. 758 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
41. Id at 326. For a discussion of other issues in this case, see infra notes 92-93 and
accompanying text.
42. Id at 327.
43. 767 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, no writ).
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the account to his sons during his life, but that the defendant bank and bank
officer defrauded the sons by not revealing information about the account to
the sons when they requested payment. The jury further awarded the sons
exemplary damages from the bank and the bank officer. The trial court dis-
regarded the jury's finding that the funds in the account were not the subject
of an inter vivos gift and awarded actual damages with prejudgment interest
plus the exemplary damages determined by the jury. The appeals court
found that the decedent did not intend the funds in the account to be a gift
to his sons; thus title to the funds would devolve under the terms of the
decedent's will." The sons could not prove an interest in the funds in the
account, so they could not recover actual damages for fraud or exemplary
damages. 45
III. HEIRSHIP
Social Security Benefits for Illegitimate Children. In two cases," the Fifth
Circuit determined that natural children of deceased wage earners are enti-
tled to Social Security benefits because the children stand to inherit from the
decedent under the Texas intestacy statute.47 A minor entitled to take a
decedent wage earner's personal property under the intestacy laws of the
state in which the decedent wage earner was domiciled at the time of death
may obtain Social Security survivor's benefits.48 In Smith v. Bowen 49 the
court, interpreting Texas law, found that the minor was the natural child of
the decedent, thus entitling the minor to survivor's benefits.50 The court
44. Id. at 500.
45. Id. The court held that exemplary damages cannot be awarded in the absence of
actual damages. Id
46. Garcia v. Sullivan, 883 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1989); Smith v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1165 (5th
Cir. 1989).
47. 883 F.2d at 20; 862 F.2d at 1168.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (Supp. 1987).
49. 862 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1989).
50. Id at 1168. The court noted that it was bound by the law of Texas at the time that
the application for benefits was originally made in determining the minor's eligibility to receive
the benefits. Id at 1166 (citing Cox v. Schweiker, 684 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1982)). The minor's
mother originally applied for benefits for the child in 1981, at which time the child could
inherit from his natural father under three theories: "(I) the child was born or conceived
before or during the marriage of his father and mother; or (2) was legitimated by Chapter 13 of
the Texas Family Code; or (3) the father executed a statement of paternity as provided by§ 13.22" of the Family Code. Id; Tax. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b) (Vernon 1980). The child's
parents were never married, nor did the decedent execute a statement of paternity. In 1981
chapter 13 of the Family Code provided that a court determination of paternity must be filed
within one year of the child's birth, but the child was over two when his mother first applied
for benefits without receiving a judicial determination of paternity. In 1982, however, the
United States Supreme Court, in Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982), held that the Texas
statute's requirement that a judicial determination of paternity be initiated within one year of
the child's birth was unconstitutional because it denied illegitimate children equal protection
under the law. Id. at 100-01. The Smith v. Bowen court determined that because the child in
this case had no remedy available to him because the statute of limitations for bringing an
action seeking a judicial determination of paternity was unconstitutionally short when he
sought benefits, the court must examine the evidence presented to the administrative law judge
to determine whether a Texas court would find that the child was the natural child of the
decedent. 862 F.2d at 1167-68. The court found that the child was the decedent's natural
child and was thus eligible for survivor's benefits. Id at 1168.
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held, in Garcia v. Sullivan,sI that a final decree of paternity entered in state
court entitled a minor child to survivor's benefits.52
Intestate Succession. The Tyler court, in Henson v. Jarmon,5 3 held that the
trial court did not err in applying section 42(b) of the Probate Code54 as it
was amended after the decedent's death, to a determination of heirship pro-
ceeding brought by the decedent's two natural daughters.55 The decedent,
who died intestate, was not survived by a spouse or legitimate children. The
decedent's heirs other than the two natural daughters consisted of his sib-
lings and some nephews and a niece. The jury found that the two daughters
were in fact the decedent's natural daughters and the trial court ordered that
the two natural daughters would each inherit one-half of the decedent's es-
tate. The other heirs appealed, contending that the decedent died prior to
the enactment of the 1987 amendment to section 42(b)5 6 and the court's
application of the amendment to the case denied them of their statutory in-
heritance rights. Section 37 of the Probate Code provides that inheritance
rights immediately vest in a person's heirs when that person dies intestate.57
The appeals court relied on Reed v. Campbell"8 to find that the failure to
apply the 1987 amendment to section 42(b), even though the decedent died
prior to its enactment, would have resulted in deprivation of the daughters'
equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. 59
51. 883 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1989).
52. Id at 20. The child's mother and father were engaged to be married when the mother
became pregnant. The father died shortly thereafter. In the mother's original application for
survivor's benefits for the child, she asserted that the father was contributing to her support at
the time of his death. The mother apparently attempted to claim benefits for her child under
42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii)(Supp. 1987), which allows benefits if the decedent wage earner
contributed to the minor's support at the time of death. The administrative law judge denied
benefits, reasoning that the decedent was not contributing to the minor's support at the time of
his death since the minor was unborn. The district court affirmed. Some years later the
mother obtained the decree of paternity on behalf of her child in a proceeding notified to all
interested parties. The decedents parents represented him and consented to the entry of thejudgment. Following the entry of the order, the mother applied for, but was denied, benefits
under 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A)(Supp. 1987). The court held that the Secretary of Health and
Human Services should have followed the state court's ruling in the paternity proceeding and
should have allowed the minor survivor's benefits. 883 F.2d at 20.
53. 758 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, no writ).
54. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
55. 758 S.W.2d at 371.
56. Prior to the 1987 amendment, an illegitimate child could inherit from his or her father
if the child were born or conceived before or during the parents' marriage, if a court entered a
decree of legitimation pursuant to chapter 13 of the Family Code, or if the father executed a
statement of paternity in conformity with Family Code § 13.22. Tx. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 42(b) (Vernon Supp. 1987). The 1987 amendment provided a fourth method by which the
child could claim paternal inheritance rights by allowing the child to prove that he or she was
the father's biological child. Tax. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
57. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
58. 476 U.S. 852 (1986).
59. 758 S.W.2d at 371. The court found that no legitimate state interest would be affected
by the application of the amended statute in making the determination of whether the women
were the natural daughters of the decedent. Id. The daughters filed their application for heir-
ship within two months after the decedent's death, prior to the distribution of any of the estate
to the other heirs. Thus, the court's order did not affect the legitimate interests that the state
has in the orderly administration and distribution of the estate. IM
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In Palmer v. State6W the Houston court reversed a guilty verdict of crimi-
nal trespass.61 The appellant's father died intestate in 1983, survived by his
second wife and his daughter. The second wife died in 1986 and left her
interest in real property to two other individuals, one of whom was executrix
of her estate. The executrix listed the real property on the inventory as the
second wife's separate property and then deeded the real property to herself
by an Executrix's Warranty Deed. The executrix placed a notice on the
property that anyone, including the appellant, who attempted to enter the
premises would be liable in criminal trespass. The appellant continued to
visit the premises and was prosecuted for criminal trespass. The appellate
court held that the appellant could not have committed criminal trespass
since the property did not belong to another because the appellant's interest
in the property vested immediately upon her father's death.62 The court
noted that tenants in common have equal rights to possession of the real
property.6 3 The court accordingly reversed the trial court and ordered ac-
quittal on the criminal trespass charge.64
Proof of Intestacy. In Guajardo v. Chavana65 the San Antonio court re-
versed the trial court's holding that the decedent died intestate66 and held
that, as a result, the court's determination of heirship was premature.6 7 The
decedent's widow, a son from a prior marriage, and two women who claimed
to be his natural daughters survived him. The son, appointed the temporary
administrator of his father's estate, filed an application for determination of
heirship seeking to have the widow and himself declared the sole heirs. The
son then filed a motion for summary judgment on the application for decla-
ration of heirship. The affidavit fied in support of his motion stated that his
father died intestate, but contained no evidence supporting that statement.
The trial court entered an order finding that the decedent died intestate and
that the widow and son were the sole heirs. The appeals court held that the
son did not prove conclusively that the decedent died intestate.68 The son
had admitted in a deposition that his father had told him that he had a will.
Additionally, uncontested evidence indicated that the son did not search for
a will among his father's papers. A summary judgment on the issue was
thus inappropriate.69 The appeals court also noted that the son failed to
follow the order of temporary administration because he did not collect his
father's papers from his stepmother in order to protect the estate for the
60. 764 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1988, no pet.)
61. Id at 336.
62. Id at 334. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37 (Vernon Supp. 1989) provides that an intes-
tate decedent's property immediately vests in his or her heirs upon the decedent's death. The
elements of criminal trespass include the provision that a person enter or remain on the prop-
erty of another with notice that his or her entry is forbidden or notice that he or she is to
depart the premises. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05 (Vernon 1989).
63. 764 S.W.2d at 335.
64. Id. at 336.
65. 762 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, writ denied).
66. Id. at 684.
67. Id at 685.
68. Id at 684.
69. Id. at 685.
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benefit of the decedent's creditors and heirs.70 Finally, the court noted that
the reversal of an in rem proceeding, such as the administration of a person's
estate, applies to all persons interested in the decedent's estate. 71
IV. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
Jurisdiction. In Erbs v. Bedard72 the Dallas court found that the probate
court had no subject matter jurisdiction to hear several causes of action that
were essentially shareholder derivative actions.73 The court, however, re-
fused to rule on another cause of action, asserted for the first time in the
third amended petition, because the probate court had never had the oppor-
tunity to rule on its jurisdiction.74 In Elliott v. Hamilton 75 the Beaumont
court found that the trial court had jurisdiction to enter judgment in the
absence of written pleadings.76 The Dallas court of appeals in Gaynier v.
Ginsberg77 found that the district court should have continued to exercise its
jurisdiction when the pleadings showed that the statutory probate court did
not have adequate jurisdiction to grant the full relief requested. 78
Evidence. The Corpus Christi court in In re Estate of Plohberger79 found
that the trial court did not commit reversible error by failing to exclude
prejudicial evidence when the evidence to which the appellant objected had
70. Id
71. Id. One of the two alleged natural daughters did not pursue the appeal. The other
requested that the findings of the appeals court apply to both of them.
72. 760 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
73. Id at 752. The personal representatives of a decedent's estate brought these causes of
action in their capacity as shareholders rather than in their capacity as personal representatives
of the estate.
74. Id at 753. This new cause of action was brought in the name of the decedent's estate
and alleged that the defendant had made tortious acts that harmed the estate itself, not just the
estate as a shareholder in a corporation. The court also found that a visiting probate judge
who had assigned himself to this case did not have an unambiguous statutory duty to disqual-
ify himself. Id. at 755. The judge thus did not abuse his discretion for refusing to do so. Id
For a discussion of an earlier appeal of this case, see Candler, 1989 Annual Survey, supra note
4, at 321 n.118.
75. 767 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, writ denied).
76. Id at 263. One of the decedent's daughters filed an application to probate his will
after the original application to probate the same will had been contested. The daughter an-
nounced at the commencement of a jury trial that she had settled with the contestants. After
trial to the jury, with the jury answering all questions in favor of the will proponents, the trial
court entered an order admitting the will to probate. The will contestants appealed, asserting
that the trial court had no jurisdiction to enter judgment in the absence of written pleadings.
The appeals court noted that the daughter did not withdraw her application to probate, nor
did she file a nonsuit or dismissal. Id The appeals court also noted that the contestants did
not object to the absence of pleadings prior to their motion for new trial and that the will
proponents would have been bound by res judicata had the jury answered its issues adversely
to them. Id
77. 763 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
78. Id at 463. The court noted that TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5A(b) (Vernon Supp.
1990) does not fully divest the district court's jurisdiction if the probate court cannot grant the
relief requested. Id. One remedy sought in this case was the removal of a trustee, which, at
the time the case was filed, only the district court had jurisdiction to grant. Because the pro-
bate court could not grant this relief, the appeals court held that the district court should have
continued to exercise jurisdiction. Id
79. 761 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
1990]
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previously been submitted to the jury with no objection.80 The evidence
consisted of the medical records that were entered to show the decedent's
state of mind. The appellant did not object to the entry of the medical
records themselves, but did object when enlarged copies of some of the medi-
cal records were introduced. The court noted that the appellant's failure to
object when the evidence was first introduced rendered harmless any error
for allowing the introduction of prejudicial evidence."' The court also found
that the will admitted to probate was a valid will even though the testator
had signed on one page and the witnesses had signed on another.82 Finally,
the court found that a will executed under undue influence was void and
could not serve to revoke a previous will.8 3
In Evans v. Evans84 the Texarkana court examined the language of a re-
lease of lien and parol evidence concerning the recitation of consideration in
the release.3 5 The decedent conveyed some real property to one of her sons,
who executed a promissory note and deed of trust. After the son made his
first annual payment under the note, the decedent executed a release of lien,
reciting that the underlying indebtedness had been paid in full. The son
continued making annual payments on the note until the decedent's death,
when he filed the release of lien. The estate sued the son, alleging that he
obtained the release of lien by undue influence and that the underlying in-
debtedness on the property still existed. The jury found that the son did not
exert undue influence on the decedent and that the decedent did not intend
to release the underlying indebtedness. The appeals court noted that parol
evidence is admissible to show that the consideration recited in a document
was not* actually paid. 6 All parties testified that the note was never fully
paid, so the burden shifted to the son to prove that the decedent intended to
release the full amount of the indebtedness despite his failure to pay the note
in full. 87 The court found that, since the son did not meet this burden, the
estate did not have a lien on the real property.88 Rather, the son owed the
full amount outstanding on the note to the estate.8 9
Necessary Parties, Standing and Capacity to Sue. In Migura v. Dukes90 the
supreme court found that a devisee under a will is not a necessary party to
an action brought to establish a lien against real property included in the
80. Id. at 450.
81. Id at 449.
82. Id. at 450.
83. Id.
84. 766 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, no writ).




89. Id The court also found that the son owed the estate attorney's fees of ten percent of
the unpaid amount of the note because the son failed to show that the ten percent attorney's
fees provided for in the note were unreasonable. Id
90. 770 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. 1989).
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decedent's estate.9 1 In Jones v. LaFargue92 the Houston court found that
the trial court could proceed to judgment in a will contest brought by the
decedent's heirs even though the court made no finding that all of the dece-
dent's heirs were joined in the suit.93 In Estate of Hill 94 the Amarillo court
held that since the trial court conducted an in limine proceeding to deter-
mine the contestant's standing prior to the time that the jury was sworn, the
standing issue was presented for the court's decision prior to the time that
the issue of the will contest was heard on its merits.95 The Fort Worth
court, in Shiffers v. Estate of Ward,96 held that a verified denial of plaintiff's
capacity to sue, filed after a hearing on the merits, resulted in waiver of the
right to complain of the plaintiff's lack of capacity to sue.97 In Morrison v.
Brewster & Mayhall9s the El Paso court found that a person who unsucess-
fully sought the probate of a will under which that person was named execu-
tor could not sue as executor since he was not the executor.99
91. Id at 569. The court noted that title to the property was not in issue. Id Only the
personal representative of the estate was a necessary party. Id The supreme court reversed
the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court. Id The court of appeals based
its decision on its determination that the suit involved title to the property. 758 S.W.2d 831,
833 (rex. App.--Corpus Christi 1988).
92. 758 S.W.2d 320 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
93. Id. at 324. The court found that the potential absence of necessary parties did not
deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction because the appellants did not file a verified plea in
abatement. I The heirs who contested the will proved in an in limine proceeding that they
had standing to contest the will as the decedent's nieces and nephews, because the decedent
died unmarried and without issue and had no surviving parent or siblings. For a discussion of
other issues in this case, see supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
94. 761 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, no writ).
95. Id at 531. The determination of whether a party is an interested party and has stand-
ing to bring a will contest must be determined in a preliminary in limine proceeding before the
court without the jury. See Sheffield v. Scott, 620 S.W.2d 691, 693 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In this case, the contestant had accepted benefits under the
will prior to entering her contest. The trial court found in the in limine proceeding that she
was, therefore, not an interested person who could bring a will contest. The appeals court
determined that the rule that a trial commences when the jury is sworn should apply to both
criminal and civil cases. 761 S.W.2d at 531.
96. 762 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied).
97. I at 755. The plaintiff, who was appointed administrator of her husband's estate
pending filing a bond and taking the oath, filed suit in her representative capacity prior to the
time that she filed the bond and oath. A hearing on the merits of the suit was held prior to the
time both that she filed her bond and oath and the defendant filed his verified denial of her
capacity to sue. The appeals court stated that even if the defendant had filed his verified denial
in a timely manner, it would have only served to abate the proceeding until the plaintiff quali-
fied as administrator. Id The court also held that the plaintiff did not have to be joined in her
individual capacity to recover on her community one-half of the amount in controversy since
she could have qualified as community administrator under TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 161
(Vernon 1980). 762 S.W.2d at 757.
98. 773 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. App.-E Paso 1989, no writ).
99. Id at 608. The decedent attempted to execute a will naming his nephew as a primary
beneficiary and executor, but the decedent failed to sign the will on the execution line,
although he signed the first two pages of the will and the self-proving affidavit. The witnesses
signed only the self-proving affidavit. The decedent attempted to execute the will at the Gov-
ernment Employees Credit Union. After the decedent's death, the nephew attempted to pro-
bate the will, but the court denied probate. The nephew consulted with his attorneys, who
advised him that his cause of action against the credit union for improperly overseeing the
execution of the will would expire two years from the date the will was denied probate. The
nephew, individually and as executor, sued the credit union and his former attorneys for negli-
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Claims Against the Estate. In Estate of Nelson v. Neal 100 the Texarkana
court held that the appointment of a temporary administrator in the estate of
a nonresident decedent, with the later conversion of the temporary adminis-
tration to a limited permanent administration, was within the probate
court's discretion. 101 The appeals court further found that the appointment
could continue until either the necessity for administration no longer existed
or the executor of the decedent's estate became qualified to serve as a full or
ancillary executor in Texas.10 2 The decedent and others aboard his airplane
died in a crash in Bowie County on December 31, 1985. One year following
the accident the widow of one of the passengers on the airplane fied suit in
federal district court against the decedent's estate and others for damages
resulting from her husband's death. Almost two years after the accident the
widow's attorney filed an application for the appointment of a temporary
administrator in the decedent's estate in the probate court of Bowie County.
The widow sought appointment of a temporary administrator for the sole
purpose of having a person to serve with process in the tort action within the
two-year statute of limitations. The court appointed a temporary adminis-
trator in the estate and limited the temporary administrator's duties "to re-
ceiving service of process in suits filed against the estate, to making demands
on any insurance company which may be liable in claims against the estate,
and to forwarding process and tendering defense to such insurance com-
pany."103 The decedent's son contested the appointment of the temporary
administrator as improper under section 131A of the Probate Code'04 be-
cause the decedent had a will that was duly admitted to probate in Califor-
nia, and an executor had been appointed and letters testamentary had been
issued in the decedent's estate. The probate court determined that the tem-
porary administration should be continued and later changed the temporary
administration to a permanent administration. The decedent's son appealed.
The court of appeals first determined that no proof of a pending will contest
is necessary under section 13 1A of the Probate Code.105 Thus, the fact that
no one contested the will had no bearing in the appointment of the adminis-
trator.'0 6 The court next found that the probate court could appoint an
administrator despite the fact that the decedent died testate and that an ad-
ministration of the decedent's estate existed in another state.10 7 Finally, the
gence. The trial court granted the attorneys' motion for summary judgment and severed the
action against the credit union. The appeals court agreed with the attorneys' analysis that the
statute of limitation for bringing a negligence action against the credit union was two years
from the day the will was denied probate, the date on which the nephew's cause of action
accrued and affirmed the trial court. Id at 610.
100. 764 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, writ granted).
101. Id at 327.
102. Id
103. Id at 324. The application alleged that the applicant did not know whther the dece-
dent had a will and that the necessity for administration existed because of the claims that the
widow and her children had against the estate.
104. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 131A (Vernon Supp. 1989).
105. 764 S.W.2d at 325.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 325-26. An application for temporary administration under Probate Code
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court found that venue was proper in Bowie County because the decedent
died in Bowie County, the tort claims arose in Bowie County, and the exist-
ence of the tort claims made the administration of the estate a necessity.108
In San Antonio Savings Association v. Beaudry 1 09 the Dallas court held
that administrative expenses incurred in connection with the preservation
and maintenance of property subject to a secured claim shall be paid prior to
the payment of the secured claim itself.110 The decedent died intestate with
an insolvent estate. The decedent's property included his residence, which
had two liens created under deeds of trust in excess of its value. The trial
court allowed the claims of both lienholders as preferred liens and found
that San Antonio Savings, which held the first lien on the residence, had a
superior lien to the second lienholder. The administrator of the estate
claimed administrative expenses, mostly for legal services rendered by the
administrator and his law firm, incurred in connection with preseiving and
selling the residence. San Antonio Savings attempted to have the proceeds of
the sale of the residence exempted from any claims for administration ex-
penses. The administrator cross-claimed for the expenses. The administra-
tor's records showed expenses for maintenance of the property, including
utilities, repairs, and lawn service; closing costs due on the sale of the prop-
erty; and attorney's fees, including the ongoing fees incurred in connection
with pursuing the administrator's claim. The administrator incurred some
of the attorney's fees in connection with obtaining a lower appraised value
for the property for ad valorem taxes. The appeals court found that the
closing costs and the expenses incurred in maintaining the property should
be paid prior to payment to the preferred lienholder.111 The court also de-
§ 131A must include information required under TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 82 (Vernon Supp.
1990), which pertains only when the decedent died intestate. The court cited King v. King,
230 S.W.2d 335, 341 (rex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1950, writ ref'd), for the proposition that a
temporary administrator can be appointed only if another administration with full powers does
not exist. 764 S.W.2d at 326. The court stated as follows:
We interpret the King case to mean that a temporary administrator cannot be
appointed when an administration with full powers exists within the State of
Texas. This does not mean that a temporary administrator cannot be appointed
in Texas when an administration exists in another state. Furthermore, the pro-
vision in Section 82 deals with an administration with full powers, and for such
an administration it would be necessary to establish the intestacy so that the
property could be properly divided under the laws of descent and distribution of
this State. The present temporary administration does not deal with the distri-
bution of property and was taken out for limited purposes under which the in-
testacy is not vital; therefore, the failure to show specifically intestacy is not fatal
to the applicants.
Id The court further stated that the method for ending the administration in this case would
be for the executor to file an ancillary probate and receive ancillary letters testamentary in
Texas. Id at 326-27.
108. 764 S.W.2d at 327. The court also found that the decedent's liability insurance policy
was an asset of the estate sufficient to support the necessity of administration. Id
109. 769 S.W.2d 277 (rex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
110. Id at 278, 280. In order to be paid out of the sales proceeds prior to the secured
claim, the administrative expenses must be "directly related to preserving, maintaining, and
selling the property" subject to the preferred lien. Id at 280.
111. Ird at 280-81. Without the payment of the expenses for maintaining the property, the
court reasoned, the property would have further decreased in value, thus resulting in less re-
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termined, however, that the attorney's fees incurred in determining the pri-
ority of the two liens or collecting payment of administrative expenses did
not result in the preservation or maintenance of the property. 1 2
The Dallas court, in Texas Department of Mental Health & Mental Retar-
dation v. Crawford,113 held that the decedent's estate owed the state for costs
of hospitalization in a state hospital on three occasions. " 4 The state was, as
a matter of law, entitled to a money judgment for those amounts." 5 The
state apparently never billed the decedent or anyone else for the costs of the
decedent's first hospitalization. The decedent's daughter, who was also her
guardian and independent executrix of the decedent's estate, paid the
amount the state billed for the second hospital stay. The state sent bills for
the final admission to the decedent's daughter. The daughter did not pay
these bills and the state turned them over to a claims officer for collection
following the decedent's death. The claims officer determined that the dece-
dent's estate owed the state for the full amount of the first hospitalization,
and for parts of the second and third hospitalizations. On trial, the jury
found that the decedent was not indigent, that the state had waived its right
to recover for amounts owing from the first and second admissions, and that
the state could only recover partially on the final admission. The trial court
found that the payments and credits exceeded the portion that the jury
found was due and entered a take nothing judgment for the state. The ap-
peals court found that the executrix failed to file a sworn denial of the state's
verified claim, so that the verified claim was prima facie evidence of the
amount due the state.' 1 6
Characterization of Community and Separate Property. In Martin v. Mar-
tin 1 7 the Houston court held that the surviving spouse should reimburse the
community estate for amounts spent by the community in reducing the in-
debtedness against the surviving spouse's separate property.118 The dece-
covery for the preferred lienholder. Id at 281. The court also stated that the attorney's fees
incurred in obtaining the lower ad valorem property valuation should be paid before the pay-
ment to the preferred lienholder because obtaining the lower valuation helped preserve the
property. Id
112. Id at 281.
113. 771 S.W.2d 624 (rex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
114. Id at 630.
115. Id
116. Id. at 627-28. The executrix filed a sworn denial with her original answer, but she
failed to do so with her amended original answer. The appeals court noted that under TEx.
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3196a, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1989) a verified account is sufficient
evidence to authorize a judgment in favor of the state in a suit to recover for the costs of
hospitalization of nonindigent patients in state mental hospitals. 771 S.W.2d at 627. The ap-
peals court further held that no evidence supported the jury's finding that the state had no
costs of hospitalization other than the third admission because the state offered the verified
claim. Id. at 629. Further, the appeals court found that the state did not waive its right to
reimbursement for its costs in connection with the first and second admissions because the
state, as a matter of law, did not waive its right to reimbursement through "such official acts as
would warrant an inference of relinquishment of right." Id at 630.
117. 759 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1988, no writ).
118. Id. at 465. The surviving spouse owned a home at the time she married the decedent.
After their marriage, the couple paid off the existing indebtedness on the house and made
improvements to the house and the surrounding real property. The probate court determined
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dent owned two lots in Houston at the time of the marriage. Following the
marriage, the couple erected a new building on one of these lots and bought
a third lot. Approximately two years before the decedent's death, the couple
sold the three lots for cash and a promissory note. The decedent's daughter
claimed that the promissory note should be characterized as her father's sep-
arate property rather than as community property, as characterized on the
inventory. Both the probate court and the appeals court found that the
daughter did not clearly trace the amount of the sales proceeds that should
be allocated as her father's separate property.1 19 Further, the sales proceeds
were so commingled that the separate portion of the proceeds could not be
clearly identified. 120
Successor Fiduciaries. In Estate of Touring12 1 the Houston court reversed
and remanded and instructed the probate court to issue letters testamentary
to a successor fiduciary. 122 MTrust Corp was substituted as a successor co-
executor under the Substitute Fiduciary Act 123 and applied for revised let-
ters testamentary. The probate court denied the application for the letters
testamentary and held that the Substitute Fiduciary Act was unconstitu-
tional and that MTrust had not complied with the Probate Code provisions
allowing the appointment of a successor fiduciary. The decedent's will
named his wife and Bank of the Southwest as independent co-executors.
MBank Houston succeeded Bank of the Southwest and qualified as co-exec-
utor. The probate court admitted the decedent's will and first codicil to pro-
bate, and the clerk issued letters testamentary to the decedent's wife and
MBank Houston as co-executors. MBank Houston and MTrust Corp, both
subsidiaries of MCorp, agreed to substitute MTrust Corp as successor in-
dependent co-executor through the execution of a written substitution agree-
ment pursuant to the provisions of the Substitute Fiduciary Act. MTrust
Corp filed an application for grant and issuance of letters testamentary and
an amended application for probate. The probate court denied both applica-
tions, finding that the Substitute Fiduciary Act violates both substantive and
procedural due process124 and the Texas Constitution. 125 The court further
determined that the Act is self-effectuating even if it is constitutional, thus
requiring no further judicial action. In addition, the probate court found
that the surviving spouse should reimburse the community for the funds used to build the
improvements to the property, but refused to require reimbursement of community funds used
to pay off the mortgage on the property.
119. Id. at 467.
120. Id
121. 775 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ).
122. Id at 47.
123. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 548h (Vernon Supp. 1989).
124. The probate court found that the Substitute Fiduciary Act violates substantive due
process because "no social necessity exists which is sufficient to justify the restrictions the Act
places upon the rights and liberties of testators, beneficiaries and the court." Id at 41. The
probate court found that the Act violated procedural due process because "it permits substitu-
tion of a fiduciary without the requirement of any notice other than the filing of the agreement
with the Texas Banking Commissioner which does not constitute sufficient notice." Id
125. The probate court found that the Substitute Fiduciary Act violates TEx. CONST. art.
II, § 1, because a substitute fiduciary can act without the approval of a court, allowing an
intrusion of the legislative branch of government into the judicial branch.
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that MTrust failed to comply with the provisions of the Probate Code relat-
ing to the appointment of a successor independent executor. 126 The appeals
court first determined that the Substitute Fiduciary Act does not violate sub-
stantive due process because it is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. 127 The
court next determined that the Act does not violate procedural due process
because it provides sufficient notice of the substitution of fiduciaries. 28 The
court also found that the Act does not violate the Texas Constitution provi-
sion for separation of powers. 129 The court found that, although a substitu-
tion of a successor fiduciary occurs automatically under the Substitute
Fiduciary Act, the probate court has no discretion to refuse to direct the
clerk to issue letters testamentary.130 Finally, the court held that sections
145 and 154A of the Probate Code13' do not apply to the substitution of a
successor fiduciary under the Substitute Fiduciary Act.' 32
V. GUARDIANSHIPS
In a mandamus proceeding the Houston court, in Portanova v. Hutchi-
son, 133 considered the propriety of guardianship accountings. The guardian
of the person sought relief from providing a new guardian of the estate with
accountings for some $18,000,000 distributed over several years to the
guardian for the ward's support. The court found that a successor guardian
of the estate may demand an accounting from the guardian of the person. 134
The court further found that the fact that the prior guardian of the estate
126. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 88(e), 145, 154A (Vernon 1980).
127. 775 S.W.2d at 44. The court included a lengthy analysis of the Act under the tests for
determining whether substantive due process has been violated, Id at 42-44, and concluded as
follows: "[i]t is evident that the Act's purpose is rationally related to its means. The legitimate
state interest in ensuring maximal investment opportunities for estates outweighs its minimal
effect on a testator's personal and property rights." Id at 44.
128. Id at 44, 45. The Act requires that, prior to the substitution, the fiduciaries provide
written notice to any beneficiary, each co-fiduciary, and other persons interested in the estate.
TEX. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 548h, § 2(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1989); see 775 S.W.2d at 44.
Additionally, in this case, notice of the substitution was posted pursuant to TEx. PRoB. CODE
ANN. § 33(f)(2) (Vernon 1980).
129. 775 S.W.2d at 45. The court noted that the legislature, not the constitution, granted
authority over probate proceedings to the probate courts. Id The court also noted that the
probate court has a mandatory duty to admit a will to probate if the executor is not disquali-
fied by law to serve and that the probate court has no discretionary powers over the appoint-
ment of the executor. Id.
130. Id. at 47. The court noted that third parties with whom the fiduciary must deal look
to letters testamentary as the authority for a fiduciary's actions and that, if a successor fiduci-
ary is qualified to serve, the successor is entitled to letters testamentary. Id. at 46.
131. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 145, 154A (Vernon 1980).
132. 775 S.W.2d at 47. The dissent would have held that the Substitute Fiduciary Act
violates substantive due process, Id., unconstitutionally violates a person's right to contract
under TEX. CONsT. art. 1, § 16, 775 S.W.2d at 47, and unconstitutionally "offends the long
standing case law which states that a person of sound mind has the legal right to dispose of his
own property as he sees fit and to prescribe the terms upon which his bounty should be en-joyed." Id. at 48 (Brown, J., dissenting).
133. 766 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1989, no writ).
134. Id at 857. The Probate Code requires a successor guardian to account for all prop-
erty of the ward over which the predecessor guardian had control and provides that a court
enter any necessary orders to ensure delivery of the estate to the successor. TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 224 (Vernon 1980). Additionally, the successor guardian was a party interested in the
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had previously approved of the accountings of the guardian of the person did
not prevent an examination of those prior accountings on the final ac-
count.135 Because the Probate Code does not limit the time period for which
a successor guardian of the estate of a ward is liable for accounting for assets
that came into the hands of the predecessor guardian, no statute of limita-
tions applies. 36 The court also found that, because the successor guardian
has the responsibility to account fully for the estate of the ward during the
guardianship, the production of records relating to distributions to the
guardian of the person for the benefit of the ward was not unduly burden-
some and harassing to the guardian of the person. 137
VI. TRUSTS
Fiduciary Duties. The Austin court in 183/620 Group Joint Venture v. SPF
Joint Venture 138 found that an injunction is a proper remedy when an equi-
table title holder seeks to enforce the fiduciary duty of the legal title
holder.1 39 SPF Joint Venture and others turned over a large amount of
money to 183/620 Group Joint Venture for 183/620 to use in making im-
provements to real property, including road construction and water and
sewer facilities. A dispute arose between the parties, and the appellant used
some of the funds entrusted to it by the property owners to defend the result-
ing lawsuit. SPF Joint Venture, the appellee, asked the court for a tempo-
rary injunction to prevent the appellant from utilizing the funds to defend
the suit. The trial court entered an injunction restraining the expenditure of
any additional funds entrusted to the appellant for costs of defending the
lawsuit, although the court did not address the return of funds previously
expended. The appellant appealed, claiming, among other things, that the
appellee had an adequate remedy at law. The appeals court held that proof
that a remedy at law is inadequate has no relevance in a proceeding concern-
ing the enforcement of fiduciary duties because courts of law do not enforce
fiduciary duties. 14°
estate of the ward, under section 3(r) of the Probate Code, who could seek a final accounting of
the prior guardian under section 406 of the Probate Code. 766 S.W.2d at 857.
135. 766 S.W.2d at 858.
136. Id A guardian must account for all income and distributions during the term of the
guardianship. See Tx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 405 (Vernon 1980).
137. 766 S.W.2d at 858.
138. 765 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
139. Id at 903.
140. Id The court also noted that a legal remedy, even if available, would be inadequate
because the funds would not be available for the purposes for which the property owners
entrusted them to the appellant if spent for litigation expenses. Id at 904. Thus, an injunction
to prevent further expenditure of the funds was appropriate despite the fact that 183/620
Group Joint Venture could pay damages at the conclusion of the litigation. Id The court also
found that the trial court correctly entered the injunction because the appellee had shown that
it had a "probable right to recover." Id Further, the court found, an injunction is an appro-
priate remedy when the wrongful act is ongoing, such as spending the entrusted funds for legal
fees and other costs of litigation. Id at 904-05. Finally, the court found that the trial court
had an affirmative duty to issue the injunction in order to maintain the status quo and preserve
its jurisdiction because any final judgment entered by the trial court would have no effect to the
extent of the expenditure of the funds for costs of litigation. Id at 905.
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Adverse Possession. In Pierce v. Gillespie'4 1 the Corpus Christi court ex-
amined claims of adverse possession in a trust situation arising from an ap-
peal of a trespass to try title suit. The testator, who died in 1965, left a will
under the terms of which he left certain personal property and a marital
deduction gift outright to his wife, with the residue of his estate passing in
trust for the benefit of his wife during her life with remainder to his heirs.
The wife, who served as co-executor of his estate, conveyed an undivided
one-half interest in a farm that was the husband's separate property to a
trust for her benefit in 1971. The wife granted the deed in her individual
capacity, not in her capacity as co-executor. The deed recited that the wife
took the interest in the farm as part of her marital deduction gift under her
husband's will. The jury found that no interest in the farm passed to the
wife as part of the marital deduction gift because other assets satisfied that
gift. The appeals court held that the jury's finding was not against the
weight of the evidence. 142 Because the testator did not make a specific be-
quest of the farm in his will, the farm passed to the residuary trust and
ultimately to his heirs. The appeals court next considered whether the wife's
heirs could claim any part of the farm property by adverse possession under
the three-, five-, or ten-year statute of limitations.143 The court first deter-
mined that adverse possession did not occur under the three-year statute of
limitations because the wife's heirs could not prove a chain of title from the
sovereignty. 144 The court next determined that no adverse possession oc-
curred under the five-year statute of limitations because the parties did not
provide evidence that the wife or her trustee paid taxes for five years.1 45
Finally, the court determined that no adverse possession occurred under the
ten-year statute of limitations because the wife's heirs did not establish pos-
session and use of the property for ten consecutive years.' 46
141. 761 S.W.2d 390 (rex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
142. Id at 395.
143. Id at 395-96. The court noted at the outset of this portion of its opinion the proof
that a party must present to show adverse possession under any of the three statutes of
limitation:
In order to establish adverse possession as a matter of law, the claimant must
show by undisputed evidence his actual peaceable and adverse possession of the
property continuously for the appropriate time period. Also, the claimant must
submit undisputed and conclusive evidence of probative force on each essential
element of adverse possession.
Id at 395.
144. Id at 395-96. No dispute existed concerning the chain of title from the sovereign to
the testator. The jury found that no interest in the farm passed to the wife under her hus-
band's will. Thus, the deed under which the wife's heirs claimed title was made without the
legal power to convey the property. Thus, her heirs did not hold the property under "title or
color of title." TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.024 (Vernon 1986).
145. 761 S.W.2d at 396. Under the five-year statute of limitations a person must prove that
those in possession had a claim to the property under a registered deed, paid property taxes,
and cultivated or used the property. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.025 (Vernon
1986).
146. 761 S.W.2d at 396. The elements of proof under the ten-year statute of limitations are
as follows: "the claimant must show 1) possession of the land; 2) cultivation, use or enjoyment
thereof; 3) an adverse or hostile claim; and 4) an exclusive domination over the property and
an appropriation of it for his own use and benefit for 10 years." Id.; TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 16.026 (Vernon 1986). The wife could not adversely possess the farm because,
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Constructive Trust. The Dallas court imposed a constructive trust over a
45.9-acre tract of land conveyed to a joint venture pursuant to a power of
attorney in Smiley v. Johnson.147 The principal, prior to a judicial declara-
tion of incompetence, had executed two powers of attorney, one of which
was a special power of attorney specifically authorizing the sale of the real
property, in favor of his son. The son sold the real property to a joint ven-
ture in which he owned a one-third interest. Approximately five months
after the son conveyed the property the principal's daughter applied for ap-
pointment as guardian and brought suit to reclaim the real property, alleging
that the son breached his fiduciary duty by engaging in self-dealing. The
probate court found that the principal was incompetent and appointed
guardians of the person and estate. The guardian of the estate first made an
application for approval of the sale. After investigation, however, the guard-
ian determined that the son had sold the property for less than one-third of
its value and withdrew the application. The probate court found that the
son had breached his fiduciary duty under the power of attorney by selling
the property to the joint venture, but also found that the terms of the sale
were reasonable. The probate court imposed a constructive trust in favor of
the ward's estate over the son's one-third interest in the property through his
ownership interest in the joint venture and ordered the ward's estate to sell
the constructive trust interest to the other two joint venturers. The daughter
appealed the probate court's orders. The appeals court first found that the
probate court did not err by finding that the ward was not incompetent when
he executed the two powers of attorney.148 The court found that the probate
court erred in failing to impose the constructive trust over the entire tract149
and in approving the sale of the property to the joint venture.150
In Tripp Village Joint Venture v. MBank Lincoln Centre151 the Dallas
court determined that a constructive trust cannot be imposed in the absence
as co-executor and co-trustee under her husband's will, she would have to provide notice to
each of his heirs that she was repudiating the testamentary trust, which she did not do. Fol-
lowing her death, the bank co-executor and co-trustee likewise could not repudiate the trust
without first informing the husband's heirs. Thus, neither the wife nor the bank made an
adverse or hostile claim to the property in the period following the date of the 1971 deed.
147. 763 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
148. Id at 3. Although some evidence existed that the ward had suffered some deteriora-
tion in his mental ability when he executed the two powers of attorney, no evidence clearly
established the point at which he became incapable of handling his affairs.
149. Id The other two joint venturers met with the principal and had actual knowledge of
his deteriorating mental condition. They also knew that the son, as the principal's agent under
the powers of attorney, owed a fiduciary duty to his father. The court found that the other two
joint venturers benefitted from the sale of the property just as the son did and that, since they
had actual and imputed knowledge of the fiduciary duty and of the principal's mental condi-
tion, they were liable for the son's breach of fiduciary duty. Id.
150. Id at 4. The court found that the approval of the sale was inconsistent with the
finding that the son breached his fiduciary duty. Id
151. 774 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
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of a wrongful act. 152 In Donovan v. Rankin 1-3 the court found that a con-
structive trust existed over assets that a corporation fraudulently transferred
to its shareholders. 154 In Teve Holdings Ltd. v. Jackson155 the court af-
firmed the imposition of a constructive trust over a condominium that the
appellants acquired following notice of lis pendens. 156
Evidence. In Bogart v. Somert57 the supreme court held that the standard of
proof for rebutting the presumption of a gift is clear and convincing evi-
dence.158 The decedents purchased some real property and placed title to
the property in their son-in-law's name. The decedents' heirs, other than the
daughter married to the son-in-law who held title to the property, attempted
to have title to the property transferred to them under a constructive trust
argument. The trial court submitted to the jury the issue of whether the
decedents intended a gift to their son-in-law by placing title in his name.
The court set the standard of proof for disproving donative intent as a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. The appeals court found that the proper burden
of proof to disprove the presumption of a gift was clear and convincing
evidence. '5 9
VII. LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
Charitable, Religious, and Educational Organizations. The legislature, in re-
sponse to concerns raised by the probate judges, t6° amended the Probate
Code to require the personal representative of an estate to provide notice to
any charitable beneficiary of that estate. 161 New section 3(kk) and section
152. Id. at 750. In the absence of a wrongful act one can neither profit from a wrong nor
be unjustly enriched. The underlying facts in this case involved a bank's attempts to sell collat-
eral pledged under a security agreement executed pursuant to a joint venture agreement. The
joint venture agreement gave the venture manager authority to execute security agreements
and provided that third parties could be confident that the venture manager's execution of a
security agreement was authorized by the joint venture agreement.
153. 768 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
154. Id. at 444. The shareholders continued doing business at the same location and under
the same name as the corporation except that they deleted the "Inc." at the end of the name of
the business. The shareholders did not file articles of dissolution nor did they notify creditors
of the change in proprietorship.
155. 763 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.) 1988, no writ).
156. Id. at 908. The appellant acquired the property in January 1987 and the appellees
filed the notice of lis pendens on October 10, 1985. The appellees filed the notice of lis pendens
in connection with a lawsuit against a third party alleging fraud and violation of the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act and seeking the imposition of a constructive trust over the condominium.
The final judgment, entered in favor of the appellees on October 13, 1985, ordered the third
party to sell the condominium and pay the appellees proceeds from the sale proportionate to
their constructive trust interest in the property. The third party entered a three-year lease on
the property following the entry of the judgment, then conveyed the property to the appellant
herein. The appellees subsequently purchased the property at a court-ordered sale. The ap-
peals court found the lis pendens proper and that the appellant had valid notice when it
purchased the property. Id. at 909.
157. 762 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1988).
158. Id.
159. 749 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988 writ denied). For a discussion of the
appeals court's decision in this case, see Candler, 1989 Annual Survey, supra note 4, at 333-34.
160. The probate judges from around the state worked on preparation of a bill, HB-570,
that revised various sections of the Probate Code.
161. Act of June 16, 1989, ch. 1035, § 7, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4162, 4166 (Vernon).
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3(11) add the definitions of "charitable organization" and "governmental
agency." 162 Section 81 of the Probate Code now provides that the applica-
tion for probate must state whether the will names the state, a governmental
agency, or a charitable organization as a beneficiary in the will. 163 The per-
sonal representative of the estate must give notice to the named beneficiary
by registered or certified mail no later than thirty days after the date the will
is admitted to probate. 164 The notice must include copies of the application,
order, and will. Additionally, the personal representative must file a copy of
the notice with the court.165 Section 222(b) now refers back to section
128A 166 so that any interested person can complain and have an executor
removed if the executor fails to provide notice to the state, governmental
agency, or charitable organization named in a will.167 Section 149(c) now
provides that failure to file notice is grounds for removal of any personal
representative and that the court can remove a personal representative on its
own motion.168 Section 10A now provides that an institution of higher edu-
cation as defined in section 61.003 of the Education Code, 169 or a private
institution of higher education, is a necessary party to a will contest if the
institution is named as a beneficiary in the contested will. 170
Powers ofAttorney. The legislature revised section 36A of the Probate Code,
which relates to durable powers of attorney.171 A major change, and one
that appears to be retroactive, is that a durable power of attorney does not
lapse due to passage of time unless the instrument creating the power con-
tains a time limitation. 17 2 Effective September 1, 1989, a durable power of
attorney must be signed by two witnesses and filed in the county records of
the county in which the principal resides. 173 Section 36A(d) provides that a
third party must accept an agent's authority if the instrument contains lan-
guage authorizing the agent to indemnify the third party. 174 Section 36A(f),
which applies to powers created prior to September 1, 1989, provides the
process for revoking a durable power of attorney.175
The legislature also created a new type of durable power of attorney, the
durable power for health care, but this type of power of attorney has not
been assigned a section in the Probate Code. 176 The purpose of the durable
power of attorney for health care is to ensure that one would have his or her
wishes honored in the event of later incapacitation. This new power of attor-
162. Id § 1, at 4162.
163. Id § 6, at 4165-66.
164. Id § 7, at 4166.
165. Id
166. TEX. PROS. CODE ANN. § 128A (Vernon Supp. 1990).
167. Ch. 1035, § 11 at 4167.
168. Id § 10, at 4167-68.
169. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 61.003 (Vernon 1987).
170. Act of June 16, 1989, ch. 1035,.§ 4, at 4164.




175. Id at 1551.
176. Act of June 14, 1989, ch. 491, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1669, 1669-76 (Vernon).
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ney differs from directives to physicians because directives are limited to the
terminally ill or those with life-threatening conditions. Section 2 of the Act
provides that the durable power for health care becomes effective when the
attending physician certifies that the principal lacks capacity to make health
care decisions.' 77 Treatment may not be given or withheld if principal ob-
jects. 178 For this reason the physician must make reasonable attempts to
inform the principal of the treatment or its withdrawal. 179 The agent is to
make decisions in accordance with his or her understanding of the princi-
pal's wishes, including religious and moral beliefs, or, if the agent has no
understanding, with the agent's assessment of the principal's best inter-
ests.180 Section 4 of the Act provides that the durable power for health care
must be signed by two disinterested witnesses and contain an affirmation of
the principal's ability to execute the document.' 81 This section of the Act
also provides an alternative for execution if the principal is physically unable
to sign.' 82 Section 5 of the Act provides that the durable power for health
care can be revoked by notification to the agent or health care provider,
either in writing or by another act evidencing the principal's intent to re-
voke.' 8 3 A subsequently dated power revokes an earlier power and divorce
automatically revokes a power naming an ex-spouse.184 Section 6 provides
that a durable power for health care is not automatically revoked upon ap-
pointment of a guardian.18 The probate court must consider the principal's
preferences in determining whether to suspend or revoke the agent's author-
ity.18 6 Section 10 provides that the agent and health care provider are not
liable for good faith health care decisions made under terms of the power of
attorney. 8 7 If both a durable power of attorney for health care and a direc-
tive to physicians exist, the document executed later in time controls if the
principal becomes terminally ill.188 Sections 14 and 15 provide that the prin-
cipal must sign a disclosure statement prior to executing the durable power
of attorney for health care for the power to be effective.18 9 The Act contains
an example disclosure statement.190 Section 16 provides a form of the dura-
ble power of attorney for health care.191 Section 17 of the Act contains a
procedure for near relatives or responsible adults directly interested in the
principal to contest and revoke a power of attorney in district court.192 The
177. Id § 2, at 1669-70.
178. Id at 1670.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. § 4, at 1670-71.
182. Id
183. Id § 5, at 1671.
184. Id
185. -Id. § 6.
186. Id.
187. Id. § 10, at 1672.
188. Id. § 12.
189. Id. §§ 14-15, at 1672-74.
190. Id.
191. Id. § 16, at 1674-75.
192. Id. § 17, at 1675.
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two grounds for contesting are that, at the time of execution, the principal
(1) was not of sound mind or (2) was under duress, fraud, or undue
influence. 193
The Texas "Natural Death Act". The legislature has revised article 4590h,
sections 2(4), (7), (8), and (9) of the "Texas Natural Death Act" to amend
the definitions of "life sustaining procedure" and "terminal condition" and
to add definitions for "competent" and "incompetent." 1 94 In addition, em-
ployees of a health care facility in which the declarant is a patient may not
be a witness, and the instrument must contain a statement to that effect.' 95
Illegitimacy and Presumptions of Paternity. The standards and burdens of
proof in establishing the relationship between a child and its father have not
changed, but the amendments to the Probate Code and Family Code replace
references to legitimacy or illegitimacy with references to a child's "biologi-
cal" relationship with the father. 96 The legislature revised the following
sections of the Probate Code: section 3(b), which provides the definition of
"child"; section 40, which provides for inheritance by and from an adopted
child; and section 42, which provides for the inheritance rights of
children. 197
The Pretermitted Heir Statute. The legislature attempted to resolve some
discrepancies that existed under former section 67 of the Probate Code,
which deals with pretermitted heirs.198 The statute as revised provides that a
pretermitted child for whom no provision was made in the will shall take an
intestate share of all of the estate not devised or bequeathed to the parent of
the pretermitted child. 199
Guardianships. The legislature has amended section 11 3A of the Probate
Code to require a judge to appoint an attorney ad litem to represent any
person for whom a permanent guardianship is sought.200 The legislature
added new subsection (i) to section 131, which provides that the Texas De-
partment of Human Services shall not be appointed as a temporary guardian
except as a last resort.201 The language in new section 131(i) tracks the
language in section 1301.202 The legislature also amended Probate Code sec-
tion 131A(e) to provide that the clerk issue letters to a temporary guardian
or representative within three days after the appointee qualifies, 203 rather
than within three days after the appointee files the bond, as section 131A(e)
previously provided.
Section 11 1(a)(3) now provides that an application for guardianship for a
193. Id
194. Natural Death Act, ch. 678, § 1, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2982-87 (Vernon) (to be
codified at TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 672.001-.021).
195. Id at 2983.
196. Act of June 14, 1989, ch. 375, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1477, 1477-87 (Vernon).
197. Id §§ 33-35, at 1485-86.
198. Act of June 16, 1989, ch. 1035, § 5, Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4164-65 (Vernon).
199. Id
200. Act of June 18, 1989, ch. 1261, § 1, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5082 (Vernon). This
section previously applied only to guardianships of persons who were not minors.
201. Id § 2.
202. TEx. PROB. CODE AN. § 1301 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
203. Act of June 16, 1989, ch. 1035, § 8, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4162, 4166 (Vernon).
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person sixty years of age or older must include, to the best of the applicant's
knowledge, the names of the proposed ward's spouse, siblings, and chil-
dren.204 The applicant must swear to the portion of the application that
states the names and addresses of the proposed ward's spouse, siblings, and
children.205 Section 130(e) provides that the spouse, siblings, and children
of the proposed ward must be served with notice of the proceeding by regis-
tered or certified mail. 206 Section 111 now requires, in addition to the re-
quirement that the applicant swear to the portion of the application relating
to family members of a proposed ward over the age of sixty years, that the
applicant must swear to all applications for appointment of a permanent
guardian. 20 7 New section 111 (c) requires that an application for appoint-
ment of a permanent guardian for a minor must include a statement of
whether the minor has been the subject of a legal or conservatorship pro-
ceeding within the preceding two-year period, and, if so, the nature of the
proceedings, the court involved, and the final disposition, if any.208
New subsection (d) of Probate Code section 109 sets out a presumption of
what constitutes the best interest of the ward in determining who shall be
appointed as guardian.209 Effective September 1, 1989, the appointment of
a guardian who has been convicted of "any sexual offense, sexual assault,
aggravated assault, aggravated sexual assault, injury to a child, abandoning
or endangering a child, or incest" is presumptively not in the best interest of
the ward. 210 The convicted applicant has the burden to show that the best
interest of the ward would for some reason best be served by the appoint-
ment in spite of the conviction.211
Section 236(b) of the Probate Code provides that, if securing prior court
approval is inconvenient, the guardian may now apply for subsequent ap-
proval of amounts up to $5,000 per year expended from the ward's estate for
support and maintenance of the ward.212 On application for subsequent ap-
proval, the guardian must show clear and convincing proof that the expendi-
tures were reasonable and proper.213 The legislature has also amended
Probate Code sections 144 and 404(c) to provide for a unified method for
holding monies belonging to a minor or incapacitated person in the registry
of the court.214
204. Act of June 14, 1989, ch. 330, § 2, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1297, 1298 (Vernon).
205. Id. Section 111 has also been amended, in another bill, to provide that every applica-
tion for the appointment of a permanent guardian must be sworn. Act of June 16, 1989, ch.
1164, § 1, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4782 (Vernon).
206. Act of June 14, 1989, ch. 330, § 3, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Sere. 1297, 1298 (Vernon).
207. Act of June 16, 1989, ch. 1164, § 1, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4782 (Vernon).
208. Id
209. Act of June 14, 1989, ch. 330, § 1, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1297, 1297-98 (Vernon).
210. Id
211. Id.
212. Act of June 16, 1989, ch. 1035, § 12, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4162, 4168 (Vernon).
The amount previously available for expenditure without prior court approval was $2,000.
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 236(b) (Vernon 1980).
213. Act of June 16, 1989, ch. 1035, § 12, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4162, 4168 (Vernon).
214. Act of June 16, 1989, ch. 1035, § 9, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4162, 4166-67
(Vernon). Section 144(a) allows a debtor of a minor or incapacitated person to deposit money
with the clerk of the county in which the minor or incapacitated person resides if the minor or
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Executors and Administrators. The legislature has expanded the grounds for
removal of executors and administrators. 215 Section 149C(a) now provides
that the county court, statutory probate court, and any other court with
probate jurisdiction may on its own motion, as well as on the motion of any
interested person, following a show cause hearing, remove an independent
executor for any of the reasons enumerated, including the failure to file no-
tice to charitable beneficiaries in a timely manner.216 Section 222(b) now
also provides that grounds for removal include failure to file the notice to
charitable beneficiaries in a timely manner.217
The legislature has amended section 352 with a technical correction.218
Subsection (a) formerly stated that a personal representative could not
purchase property of the estate sold by the personal representative except as
provided in subsection (b).21 9 Since subsection (c) also provided an instance
in which the personal representative could purchase property of the estate,
the legislature amended subsection (a) to refer to subsections (b) and (c). 220
Additionally, the legislature amended subsection (c) for clarification
purposes. 221
Joint Tenancies with Right of Survivorship in Community Property. The leg-
islature has revised Probate Code section 46(b) to refer to new part 3 of
chapter XI of the Probate Code as governing agreements between spouses
regarding rights of survivorship in community property.222 The legislature
added part 3 to chapter XI of the Probate Code, Community Property with
Right of Survivorship.223 New section 451 replaces the 1987 version of sec-
tion 46(b) 224 and provides that spouses may agree that all or part of their
community, whether then existing or to be acquired in the future, shall be-
come the property of the surviving spouse on the death of the first spouse to
die.225 Section 452 provides that an agreement creating a right of survivor-
incapacitated person is without a guardian. Id The amount that may be so deposited with the
county clerk has been reduced from $30,000 to $25,000 in order to conform with other Code
sections. I Section 144(a) also permits the former guardian of a ward for whom the guardi-
anship has been terminated to deposit the guardianship estate with the county clerk if the
funds are less than the $25,000 statutory ceiling. Id Section 144(b) permits the debtor of a
nonresident minor or incompetent who has no guardian in Texas to pay to the guardian of the
nonresident minor or incompetent creditor or to the county clerk of any Texas county in
which the minor or incompetent owns real property sums equal to or less than $25,000 owing
as a result of a transaction within Texas. Id at 4167. Section 404(c) now provides that the
guardianship of the estate of a minor ward may be terminated and the funds in the hands of
the guardian be deposited with the county clerk, if the estate consists of cash or its equivalent
in the amount of $25,000 or less. The amount previously was limited to $15,000. Id. § 15, at
4169.
215. Id §§ 10-11, at 4167-68.
216. Id. § 10.
217. Id § 11, at 4168.
218. Act of June 14, 1989, ch. 651, § 1, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2151 (Vernon).
219. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 352 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
220. Act of June 14, 1989, ch. 651, § 1, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2151 (Vernon).
221. Id
222. Act of June 14, 1989, ch. 655, § 1, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2159 (Vernon).
223. Id. § 2, at 2159-62.
224. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 46(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
225. Ch. 655, § 2, at 2159.
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ship must be in writing and signed by both spouses. 226 Property subject to a
survivorship agreement remains community property during the mar-
riage.227 The agreement does not affect the rights of spouses concerning
management, control, and disposition of the property unless the agreement
provides otherwise, per section 453.228 Section 454 provides that a transfer
of community property to the surviving spouse as the result of an agreement
is not a testamentary transfer.229 Section 455 provides that an agreement
may be revoked in accordance with the terms of the agreement. 230 If the
agreement does not provide for revocation, however, it may be revoked by a
written instrument signed by both spouses or by a written instrument signed
by one spouse and delivered to the other spouse.231 Sections 456 and 457
provide that an agreement that meets the requirements of chapter XI is ef-
fective without adjudication, although a surviving spouse may apply for an
order adjudicating the validity of the document.232 Section 458 states that
an order adjudicating the validity of an agreement constitutes conclusive au-
thority that the property belongs to the surviving spouse.233 The surviving
spouse with such an order may enforce his or her right to payment or trans-
fer of the property to him or her.234 Sections 460 and 461 state the rights of
third parties and creditors.235 The Act applies retroactively to agreements
executed since the effective date of the 1987 amendment to the Texas Consti-
tution236 and also to all agreements that comply with the provisions of the
Act that were entered prior to the effective date of the 1987 amendment. 237
Non-Tax Due Certificates. The legislature has repealed the provisions of
Probate Code section 410 that required, if no inheritance tax is due to the
state, an instrument in writing stating that fact and approved by the State
Comptroller of Public Accounts be ified with the final papers closing the






231. Id. at 2159-60.
232. Id Sections 456 and 457 give the requirements for an application, proof, and the
recordation of the order. Id at 2160.
233. Id
234. Id. An adjudication of the validity of an agreement may well be necessary to settle the
estate. The requirements of proving the validity of an agreement under § 456(b)(3) are sub-
stantially the same as the proof of a written will, so that these agreements usually would have
no advantages over a will.
235. Id at 2161-62. These provisions protect third parties acting without notice of an
agreement, including personal representatives without actual knowledge of the agreement and
purchasers without notice of the agreement. Because recordation provides notice, third parties
are protected if they check county records and the agreement is not recorded. A personal
representative must prove no actual knowledge of the existence of an agreement to avoid liabil-
ity for selling or disposing of the decedent's interest in any property covered by the agreement.
236. Tax. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
237. Ch. 655, § 3, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2159, 2163 (Vernon). Thus, an agreement
previously invalid because it attempted to create a survivorship interest in community property





Probate Court Jurisdiction. The legislature amended section 5 of the Probate
Code by adding new subsection (d) to provide concurrent jurisdiction for a
statutory probate court and a district court in "actions by or against a per-
son in that person's capacity as a personal representative... ."239 The last
sentence of section 5A(b) has been moved to new subsection (c), which
tracks the language in section 5(d).240 The legislature also added new sub-
sections (d) and (e) to section 5A in an effort to clarify statutory probate
court jurisdiction in matters that may not appertain or be incident to an
estate currently under administration.241 The amendments to sections 5 and
5A apply to causes of action accruing on or after September 1, 1989.242 The
legislature amended section 25.2293 of the Government Code to allow the
judge of a Travis County Probate Court to transfer a cause of action in
which the personal representative of an estate pending in the probate court is
a party.243
Trust Companies and Powers of Trustees. The legislature amended section
113.110 of the Property Code,244 addressing the sale of unproductive trust
property, in response to Perfect Union Lodge v. InterFirst Bank.245 The
amendment to section 113.110 clarifies rules for distribution of the proceeds
of unproductive property if the trustee is required by other rules of law to
convert the unproductive property.2" Section 113.053(f), as amended, pro-
vides that a financial institution may split out different parts of its trust serv-
ices and delegate some of those parts to an afliate or division that would
charge separate fees for performance of the service delegated.24 7 Section
114.001(a) of the Trust Code now provides that a beneficiary may, by writ-
ten instrument, relieve a trustee from liability for profits made from trust
management. 2" The legislature has provided that the Finance Commission
of Texas may require capital over the minimum $500,000 to ensure the
soundness of trust companies in new subsection (b) to Banking Code art.
238. Act of June 16, 1989, ch. 1035, § 6, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4162, 4169 (Vernon).
The Comptroller has not issued no-tax-due certificates for some time, thus prompting this
amendment.
239. Id. § 2, at 4162-63.
240. Id § 3, at 4163-64. The amendment to § 5A clarifies that a statutory probate court
retains jurisdiction over testamentary trusts after the administration of the decedent's estate is
complete.
241. Id at 4164.
242. Id § 18(e), at 4170.
243. Act of June 16, 1989, ch. 1131, § 2, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4674, 4674-75(Vernon).
244. Act of June 14, 1989, ch. 697, § 1, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3206, 3206-07 (Vernon).
245. 748 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. 1988).
246. Act of June 14, 1989, ch. 697, § 1, Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3206, 3206-07 (Vernon). The
provisions for the distribution of the net proceeds apply only if the trustee must sell or dispose
of the property under other provisions of the Trust Code, the governing instrument, or com-
mon law. Id at 3207.
247. Act of June 14, 1989, ch. 341, § 1, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1309 (Vernon). The
corporate fiduciary must disclose the amount charged by the affiliate or division, and this
amount must not exceed the customary or prevailing charge for comparable services. Id




Juries in Probate Matters. New section 25.0025 of the Government Code
provides that laws and rules applying to district court juries shall be fol-
lowed in actions pending in the statutory probate courts over which the dis-
trict court would have concurrent jurisdiction. 2s0 If all parties agree,
however, a six-person jury may be used. 251
Probate Judges as Magistrates. The legislature amended article 2.09 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure to provide that judges of statutory probate
courts qualify as magistrates 252 and may be charged with the duty "to pre-
serve the peace...; to issue all process intended in aid of preventing and
suppressing crime; to cause the arrest of offenders.1 25 3
Pension Plans as Exempt Property. The legislature amended section 42.0021
of the Property Code to provide that any profit-sharing, pension, Keogh
plan, annuity, or similar contract purchased with assets distributed from
other profit-sharing, pension, Keogh plans, annuities, or similar contracts
and any retirement annuity or account described by section 403(b) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 are exempt from seizure from an unsecured
creditor.254 Thus, the statute exempts from seizure during the sixty-day pe-
riod rollovers nontaxable under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.255
249. Act of June 14, 1989, ch. 344, § 1, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1311, 1312 (Vernon).
250. Act of June 16, 1989, ch. 1035, § 17, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4162, 4169-70
(Vernon).
251. Id. at 4170.
252. Act of June 14, 1989, ch. 920, § 1, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3947 (Vernon).
253. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.10 (Vernon 1977).
254. Act of June 16, 1989, ch. 1122, § 1, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4627, 4627-28
(Vernon).
255. Id. at 4628. The statute does not prohibit a participant or beneficiary from granting
an enforceable security interest in the assets to a secured creditor. Id. This amendment was
effective September 1, 1989. Id. § 2.
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